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Introduction 
 
From a general perspective performing a comprehensive analysis of the relation 
between competition and concentration in the banking industry is critical in view to evaluate 
competition policies designed for this sector, as for instance the Second European Directive 
implemented in 1992. It is well admitted that, while this directive has instantaneously restored 
competition among banks after years of tight regulatory constraints, it has also indirectly 
prompted a wave of mergers within national borders. As a result, the degree of concentration, 
measured in terms of market shares, has risen in almost all European countries. Since 
deregulation was aimed at promoting competition, this rise in concentration raises the concern 
that the reverse objective obtains. 
How do we measure the degree of competition in a market and what is its relation with 
concentration? It is well documented that the relation between competition and concentration 
cannot be reduced to the view that they are inversely related, as stated by the structure-
conduct-performance (SCP) paradigm promoted by Bain (1956). As a matter of fact, when 
taking into account the changes in market structure, the relation may be reversed: Firms tend 
to exit competitive industries in the anticipation that profits will be lower than entry costs. 
This explains why tougher price competition may be followed by an increase in the degree of 
concentration, hence delivering a positive relation that contrasts with the SCP paradigm. 
From a more specific perspective, the antitrust investigation of single cases of 
proposed mergers between dominant firms calls for an assessment of their likely impact on 
competition. To what extent a merger provides the new entity with the ability to raise prices at 
the detriment of consumers and rivals and creates the conditions favouring coordinated 
behaviour among firms is at the core of the merger policy. The literature provides contrasting 
evidence on the impact of mergers on competition in the banking system as discussed in 
Degryse and Ongena (2008) and Carletti and Vives (2009). In the short term, when the 
involved banks gain efficiency, due to economies of scale and scope, and pass on the benefits 
to consumers by reducing prices of banking products, competition is enhanced; however 
when merged banks exploit their greater market power in order to increase prices, rivalry may 
be reduced. (See Sapienza, 2002, for a discussion of these contrasting effects.) In the longer 
term, however changes in the incentive to enter or exit the industry may further affect 
competition and an empirical analysis is required to be able to assess the overall impact of 
mergers (as for instance in Focarelli and Panetta, 2003). When analysing the impact of 
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mergers among incumbent banks it is therefore crucial to rely on a model where competition 
and market structure are simultaneously determined. 
This paper proposes a measure of the degree of competition1 for the banking industry 
originated from a model where entry is endogenous. The proposed measure is obtained from 
the econometric estimation of a monopolistic competition model, where banks compete in 
retail markets by setting interest rates and branches, and captures the ability of banks to 
translate an enlargement of their branching network into higher profits. A tougher rivalry in 
interest rates reduces this ability, thus revealing greater competition. This measure is affected 
by the structure of the local market, in particular by the dispersion of market shares and the 
number of large players in the market, together with other standard measures of concentration 
such as the Herfindahl–Hirschman Index (HHI, herein). 
Our econometric model is exploited here to evaluate the impact of a merger on this 
proposed measure of competition. Indeed, after having obtained the branching network of the 
merged bank by summing the pre-merger networks, we can re-estimate the model in order to 
derive the new measure of competition. By comparing the pre- and post-merger measures of 
competition, we exhibit examples of mergers that are pro-competitive, even though the 
merger causes an obvious increase in concentration in market shares. This may occur when 
the asymmetry between market shares falls or when the number of large banks competing at 
the top in each local market rises as a result of mergers between mid-size players. 
Our measure of competition is based on a parsimonious quantity of information since 
basically it only requires a measure of the size of local markets and data on branching market 
shares of individual banks in these local markets, without any knowledge of accounting data -
even when publicly available - at this level of disaggregation. These are the same 
informational requirements used to compute the HHI, which is the measure of concentration 
commonly used in the antitrust analysis. 
Our approach is not specific to banks as it can be easily exported to other retail 
industries which require a network to distribute their products and services, as for instance in 
insurance, grocery stores, car dealers, or in industries where firms enter with one branch such 
as doctors or lawyers. 
This paper is related to the empirical literature in industrial organization based on 
game theoretical models with endogenous market structure inspired by Sutton (1991). We 
                                                            
1 In the sequel, we often simplify the term “the measure of the degree of competition” in “the measure of 
competition.” 
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depart from the SCP paradigm by empirically investigating the relation between competition 
and concentration along the line of an approach initiated by Bresnahan and Reiss (1991a, 
1991b), more recently re-examined by Berry and Tamer (2006), based on models of firms 
entry and in an application to product differentiated industries by Schaumans and Verboven 
(2011). 
Their basic idea is that, by observing the presence of a firm in a market, it is possible 
to recover information about profits and sunk costs of entry as the decision to enter reveals 
that profits are larger than entry costs; otherwise the firm would have not entered. We thus 
apply the same logic to the choice of branching: By its presence in a market with a given 
number of branches, a bank reveals that it expects to recover the cost of a branching network 
of that size. Then we can derive information about the non-observable cost of branching by 
observing the branch presence in a market. In this literature there is a potential problem of 
identification: Profits and sunk costs are in fact estimated up to a monotonic transformation. 
We have solved it here by introducing a measure of competition that only affects profits 
without affecting branching costs. In this way we are able to estimate directly a measure of 
the  degree of competition. Our paper exploits further this result to study the changes in 
market structure following a merger to measure the changes in the degree of competition.  
Our results show that the impact of mergers cannot be fully captured by measuring the 
change in market concentration only: When for instance the market structure is fragmented 
with a single dominant firm, a horizontal merger between medium-size players might restore 
competitive conditions by generating a rival for the dominant firm in the market. In this case, 
greater concentration in market shares is accompanied by greater competition, breaking down 
the inverse relation between concentration and competition. (See also Cetorelli, 1999, and 
Berger et al., 2004.) 
The paper is based on preliminary articles where we consider, as the reference 
markets, respectively the Italian provinces between 1989 and 1995 in Cerasi et al. (2000) and 
the national industry for several European countries before and after the implementation of 
the Second European Directive in 1992 in Cerasi et al. (2002). Here we apply the same 
methodology for individual banks using local markets –namely “département” for France and 
“provincia” for Italy- as the reference markets between 2004 and 2007. We are here able to 
compare two countries on the same basis, i.e., with the same model and similar reference 
markets on data of higher quality. However the main novelty here is the use of the model to 
evaluate the effect of a merger on the average degree of competition in the industry. More 
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specifically we study the effect of mergers in France, among which that of Crédit Agricole 
with Crédit Lyonnais, and the two most important mergers in the latest years in Italy, namely 
Intesa with San Paolo IMI and Unicredito with Capitalia. We find mergers with opposite 
effects on competition, pro-competitive in France, while anti-competitive in Italy. Their 
opposite impact is explained by the differences in the pre-merger structure of local markets, in 
particular in terms of dispersion of market shares and number of large banks in the market. 
More specifically, this paper is related to studies measuring competition in retail 
markets using structural models of monopolistic competition. In a recent paper Schaumans 
and Verboven (2011) estimate a measure of change in competition within a model of product 
differentiated industries and apply it to local services markets. They estimate the ordered 
probit entry model, as in Bresnahan and Reiss (1991a, 1991b), jointly with an industry 
revenue function to obtain a competition measure that adds to the estimated change in per-
firm profits due to new entry a new component linked to the elasticity of demand to  new 
entry. Their approach is close in its objective to our cci measure, but it imposes heavier data 
requirements compared to our test. This is why we think it cannot be easily adapted to 
industries characterized by a large number of firms or branches as in our case. 
Based on the idea that firms in more competitive markets suffer a larger loss in profits 
when their costs increase, Boone (2008) and Boone et al. (2007) propose a measure of 
competition that coincides with the elasticity of profits to costs. We use a similar idea by 
proposing a measure of competition that captures the ability of banks to translate an increase 
in their branching network into profits, that is the elasticity of profits to branching: In contrast 
to the other papers however, our measure of competition does not require any knowledge of 
accounting data. Cohen and Mazzeo (2007) propose a model of monopolistic competition in 
branching to estimate the competitive response of banks. Our approach is similar, since we 
both estimate directly the structural equations in order to infer non-observable entry costs; 
however we move further in exploiting the model to simulate the impact on competition of 
horizontal mergers.  
The exercise of simulation of mergers based on a structural model of monopolistic 
competition contrasts with other papers in the literature where the impact measurement is 
carried ex post on accounting  data after banking mergers have occurred. (See the applications 
to the banking industry in Molnar, 2008, and Zhou, 2008.) In those papers the exercise 
consists in estimating demand and supply parameters before the mergers and then, using them 
to simulate a change in the ownership allocation of branches with the purpose of assessing 
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their impact on competition (as surveyed in Budzinski and Ruhmer, 2008). Our objective is to 
derive an impact assessment before the merger occurs, without imposing heavy data 
requirements other than the information to compute the HHI at local market level. We believe 
that our method provides a useful guide to competition authorities to assess ex-ante the impact 
mergers.  
In Section 1 we derive the econometric test from a theoretical model of bank 
branching behaviour and propose a measure of the degree of competition in local markets. 
The results of the econometric test applied to individual bank data in local markets in France 
and Italy are presented in Section 2. Section 3 is devoted to the evaluation of the ex ante 
impact of specific horizontal mergers on the degree of competition using our econometric 
model, while Section 4 discusses the relation between our estimated measure of competition 
and concentration in market shares. Finally Section 5 concludes the paper. 
 
 
1. Definition and measure of the degree of competition  
 
We first define the degree of competition within a reduced-form model of 
monopolistic competition where branching is a strategic competitive tool for banks in local 
markets.2 Then we derive an econometric model to obtain an estimate of this measure of 
competition in the banking industry. 
 
1.1. The model 
In our model, banks compete on interest rates, given their choice of entry and 
branching in a specific local market.3 Each bank enters a local market whenever its expected 
profits are large enough to recover entry costs and expands its branching network up to the 
point where marginal benefits equate marginal costs. We assume that banks instantaneously 
adjust their branching networks to the optimal size in each period and market. Box 1 provides 
                                                            
2 Branching is important in retail markets since geographic proximity still represents a competitive advantage 
when monitoring opaque SMEs or when supplying current accounts, as argued in Petersen and Rajan (2002), 
Degryse and Ongena (2005), and Brevoort ans Hannan (2006). 
3 The model presented in this paper is a reduced form of a two stage model: in the first stage each bank decides 
to enter and the size of its branching network, while in the second stage it competes in interest rates. See Cerasi 
(1996) for the full characterization of the model. 
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the details of the functional form of profits, entry and branching costs for each bank i 
operating in market j. 
 
Box 1 – Brief description of the theoretical model 
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Branching size decision:  *    1ij ij ijMB MC k       (5a) 
     *   1ij ij ijMB MC k            (5b) 
Entry decision:   ijij         (6) 
where kij  is the number of branches of bank i 1,…, n in local market  j1,…,J,  Sj  is 





  is the  total number of branches in local market j, ij are total sunk costs of 
bank i in market j , aij  is the cost for bank i of entering in market j with a first branch, bij is the 
marginal cost of branching for bank i in market j. 
 
Disaggregate profits of bank i in local market j given by Equation (1) are a proportion 
of total market size S, which, in our case, is measured as the total deposits in that market. The 















 , is a function of the 
branching market share of the bank, measured by its number of branches over the total 
number of branches in that specific market. The parameter ccij captures the ability of banks to 
translate an increase in their branching network in market j into larger profits. As such, this 
parameter ccij is inversely related to the degree of competition in market j. We return on this 
point below. 
Note that the profit of bank i only depends upon observable variables, that is, the 
number of branches owned by bank i in market j, the market size Sj and the total number of 
branches Nj in that market.  
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By using this specification, we are imposing several properties to the profit function. 
First, per-bank profit increases with total market size Sj since a fixed number of banks in a 
larger market manage to share greater revenues. Second, per-bank profit decreases with the 
overall number of branches in the market Nj: As the market becomes further crowded with 
branches, per-bank profit shrinks. Third, per-bank profit increases with own branches kij at a 
rate given by the parameter ccij according to Equation (2): The more intense is the 
competition in interest rates in a given market, the smaller the per-bank profit and marginal 
gain of opening a new branch. This is why our parameter measures, although indirectly, 
competition in interest rates in market j through its effect on the elasticity of profits to 
branching.4 If competition in interest rates becomes tougher then the additional gain from 
opening a new branch decreases. Hence a smaller ccij captures greater competition in market 
j.  
The optimal branching size is achieved when its marginal benefits equates its marginal 
costs of branching. From Equation (3), branching costs are linear in kij and therefore the 
marginal cost bij in Equation (4), is constant. Each bank sets its branching network size at 
* 1ijk  , according to Equation (5a) by equating the marginal benefit of an additional branch to 
the marginal cost; otherwise * 1ijk   if Equation (5b) holds. 
Dropping the subscripts, for given S and N, the optimal branching size increases with 
cci and decreases with marginal branching cost. For a given market size and number of 
competitors, if competition in the market becomes tougher (lower cci) the bank may end up 
closing branches ( *k  will decrease) since the expected gains from a larger branching network 
shrink. 
We may explain the choice of the optimal branching size with a numerical example. In 
Figure 1 we draw the constant marginal cost and marginal benefits as functions of k, given by 
Equations (2) and (4), for the values: S=6000, N-k=300, b=75. The dashed line represents the 
marginal cost MC, while the continuous line MB is the marginal benefit when cci is 0.9. The 
optimal branching size is given by the intersection between MB and MC in A at * 380k   
                                                            







, which represents the elasticity of profits to an additional branch 
whenever k/2N becomes negligible. Notice that the value cci in principle could change with the number of banks 
in the market, as indeed one might expect from a measure of competition. However as N becomes large 
relatively to k, it becomes independent.  
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approximately. If competition becomes tougher, that is when cci falls from 0.9 to 0.8, then 
MB shifts on the left (dotted line) so that the intersection is now reached in B and the optimal 
branching size shrinks to *' 100k  . Clearly in our model, a tougher price competition has 
ceteris paribus a negative impact on branching size. 
 
Figure 1 – Optimal branching size 
 
 
A final component of the model is the free entry condition which requires banks to 
enter a market only if their expected profits are greater than entry costs for given branching 
size, as stated by Equation (6). Note that we can estimate the sunk costs as soon as we have an 
estimate of marginal costs. 
 
1.2. The econometric model 
To recover branching costs from observed choices of branching, we follow an 
approach initiated by Bresnahan and Reiss (1991 a, 1991b) and reinvigorated by Berry and 
Tamer (2006). Now we explain how to achieve this objective starting from the model 
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In equilibrium either one of two branching Conditions (5a) and (5b) must hold, since 
banks adjust their branching networks to the optimal size in each period and local market. As 
the data allows us to observe the change in the number of branches from one year to the other, 
we may exploit this additional information in the econometric model in order to retrieve the 
non-observable branching costs. We classify each observation, namely a bank i in period t  
and in local market j, according to either of the following four categories: 
[a] “expanding multi-branch” bank if kijt= (kijtkijt-1) > 0 and kijt >1; 
[b] “static multi-branch” bank if kijt= 0 and kijt >1; 
[c] “shrinking multi-branch” bank if kijt < 0 and kijt >1; 
[d] “unit-branch bank if kijt= 0 and kijt =1. 
Notice that for multi-branch banks concerned by cases [a] to [c], Condition (5a) must hold, 
while for unit-branch banks in [d], Condition (5a) is replaced by Condition (5b).   
Now we substitute the definition of MBijt in the branching Conditions (5a) and (5b) 
with the following quantity 
 1
2










where, instead of the number of branches at time t, we use its lagged value kijt-1 inside the 
brackets. Notice that Aijt>MBijt  when kijt> 0, while Aijt<MBijt when kijt < 0. Then we can 
say that for any bank in [a] it must be that Aijt>MBijt , for banks in [b] and [d] it is  Aijt=MBijt , 
while for banks in [c] it is Aijt<MBijt .  
Finally, with respect to Conditions (5a) and (5b), we simplify the partitioning of all 




:  all banks in [a] and [b] so that  








The econometric test requires casting each observation into the probability space. 
Therefore we must make assumptions on the stochastic component of the model, that is to 
say, the non-observable branching cost. We assume that it is idiosyncratic, independent and 
                                                            
5 Notice that we have made an arbitrary choice when choosing to classify the “static multi-branch” banks in the 
sub-set E1t. We check the robustness of our results due to this classification criterion in the next section.  
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with known probability distribution. More specifically, we assume that the logarithm of the 
marginal cost is specified as: 
  ln  ijt ijt ijtMC mc v , (9) 
where mcijt is the deterministic component and ijt is the stochastic term with standard normal 
distribution  Φ(.). 
According to the partitioning of observations defined by Equation (8) and our 
stochastic assumptions, the probability that each observation falls either in the subset E1t 
(expanding or static multi-branch banks) or in E2t (shrinking multi-branch or unit-branch 
banks) is given by: 
 
       
       
1
2
Pr ( ) Pr Pr ln ln
Pr ( ) Pr Pr ln 1 ln
       
        
t ijt ijt ijt ijt ijt ijt ijt
t ijt ijt ijt ijt ijt ijt ijt
ij E MC A v A mc A mc
ij E MC A v A mc A mc
 (10) 
Then the likelihood function for all observations in the dataset is obtained as 








ln1lnlnlnln  (11) 
The parameters ccijt and mcijt are identifiable and estimated by maximizing the likelihood 
function. We further assume that the inverse measure of competition ccijt and the marginal 






In this section we measure the degree of competition in each local market based on the 
estimated values of the parameter cci from the econometric specification of the previous 
section. After a brief description of the dataset, we present the results. 
 
2.1. The data 
In the econometric model, the reduced form of profits, the marginal branching benefit 
and in particular the threshold value Aijt, are all functions of observable variables either 
market specific variables such as the market size Sjt measured by the total amount of deposits, 
  ‐ 12 ‐
and the total number of branches Njt in the market, or bank specific variables such as the 
number of branches of bank i in market j at time t, kijt, and its lagged value kijt-1.  
Note that our analysis does not require any knowledge of accounting data. As a matter 
of fact disaggregated accounting measures of per-bank profit are not even available at the 
local level: accounting sources provide uniquely consolidated balance sheet data, that is, 
aggregate across all markets in which the bank operates. For instance, suppose that bank A 
owns branches in market a and b: From its accounting statements we would be able to recover 
only consolidated profits across the two markets, not the two separate profits, i.e. the profit of 
bank A in market a and profit of bank A in market b, as required by the analysis of the 
competitive behavior of banks at local level. Our theoretical model however provides a simple 
proxy for the profits on each market, as expressed by the reduced form given in Equation (1), 
which is a function of the market share of the bank in each local market computed in terms of 
the number of branches. 
Our local markets are the 95 départements in France and the 103 provinces in Italy. 
Note that many brand-name banks share the same ownership. We assume that banks 
belonging to the same group tend to coordinate their decisions in terms of interest rates and 
branching. Thus groups and not banks should be the most appropriate unit of observation.6 
Each observation is therefore a banking group i operating in local market j at time t with 
given branching size ijtk .
7 
We recovered the information on the number of branches for each individual banking 
group in each local market for 2005 and 2007 in France, and for 2004 and 2006 in Italy. We 
therefore have a cross-section for each country which allows us to compute ijtk , i.e., the 
change in branching size for each group in each local market, taking 2005 (resp. 2004)  as the 
initial year for France (resp. Italy).  
                                                            
6 We consider that, on the one hand, smaller groups or independent banks have no strategic behavior as they are 
price takers and are marginally adapting their branching behavior. They are nevertheless included in the 
denominator Nj, representing the total number of branches in that market, since they nevertheless exert a 
competitive pressure on branches of the main groups in each local market behaving like a fringe. On the other 
hand, we include La Poste among banks in France as the banking part of the French postal mail provider has a 
large and dispersed network. In contrast, Poste Italiane is excluded as it did not play a similar role at the time of 
our analysis. 
7 To capture coordination among banks belonging to the same group across different local markets in our 
econometric analysis, we control for ownership by using a dummy variable specific to each group. 
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For Italy, data on bank branches by “provincia” are taken from the public site of Bank 
of Italy.8 For France data on bank branches by “départements” were provided directly by 
Crédit Agricole and Caisses d’Epargne. In France all banks have branches in each of the 95 
departments, with the only exception of C.I.C. that has no branches in Corsica. In Italy six 
national banks have branches located in almost all 103 provinces, while the remaining groups 
have their branching networks geographically concentrated in few local markets. Descriptive 
statistics in Table 1 show that the two industries are similar only for what concerns the 
dispersion of branches within markets, measured by the standard deviation. We observe 
across markets smaller average and median branching sizes for Italy, implying that there are 
larger groups in France. The number of total branches in each market is larger in France, that 
is, there are several large players simultaneously in each market.  
[Insert Table 1 here] 
Our definition of bank’s profits in each local market must be highly correlated with 
bank accounting profits, not available at this level of disaggregation. In support to this, we 
know that accounting profits are proportional to market shares in terms of deposits and, since 
these are highly correlated with branching market shares, we expect high correlation also 
between reduced profits computed in our model and observed accounting profits. 
In the empirical specification for mci, we include the dummies to identify banking 
groups in the set of explanatory variables Zit. The inverse measure of competition cci instead 
depends upon a set of market variables, Wjt, which comprises  per-capita loans (LPC), the 
proportion of rural areas in each county (SHRUR) and a dummy indicating densely populated 
urban areas (DBIGPRO). These variables are taken from the Central Statistical Offices, 
INSEE for France and ISTAT for Italy. We expect to find tougher competition the higher per-
capita loans and population density due to greater incentive to compete for the marginal client 
when demand is larger. 
 
                                                            
8 The data on branches for individual banks are taken from www.bancaditalia.it, while we have followed the ABI 
guidelines for the definition of banking groups. 
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2.2  Econometric results 
The parameter cci is estimated for 2006 in Italy and 2007 in France on cross-sections 
that we call the base models. All coefficients that result from the maximum likelihood 
estimation in Table 2 are significant, although their value is variable across markets capturing 
local differences. The signs of the coefficients associated to cci are in accordance with our 
intuition: in France in those Départments where there is a greater share of rural areas 
(SHRUR) banks face softer competition and, similarly, in Italy competition is tougher in 
those provinces where a big city is located (DBIGPRO). In addition, in both countries the 
degree of competition increases with the level of per-capita loans (LPC). 
[Insert Table 2 here] 
A measure of the performance of the model in fitting the data, defined as “goodness of 
fit”, is obtained by comparing the predicted to the actual partitioning of observations between 
subset E1  (all expanding multi-branch or static multi-branch banks) and E2 (all shrinking 
multi-branch or unit-branch banks). Table 3 reports the percentage of observations whose 
behavior in terms of branching is correctly predicted by the model: this percentage is 84% for 
France and 75% for Italy.9  
[Insert Table 3 here] 
Table 4 provides evidence that the two industries differ in terms of competition, 
branching costs and profitability. The average value of cci, is higher in Italy, 1.17, compared 
to France, 0.68 (recall that lower values of cci imply tougher competition) indicating that 
local markets are on average more competitive in France than in Italy. Note that marginal 
costs are lower in France compared to Italy and moreover, represent a smaller share of our 
estimated per-branch profits: the French bank system is not only more competitive but more 
efficient. 
[Insert Table 4 here] 
Table 5 exhibits heterogeneity of estimated marginal branching costs across banking 
groups, in particular Crédit Agricole and La Poste have higher costs and considerably lower 
per-branch profits compared to the other French groups. These two groups are indeed 
characterized by large branching networks with branches distributed all over the country, even 
                                                            
9 To check the robustness of our partitioning we have re-estimated the model moving the static multi-branch 
banks (case [b] in sub-section 1.2) from subset E1 to subset E2 defined in Equation (8). Under this partitioning 
the percentage of observations correctly classified decreases significantly. 
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in less densely populated areas. In Italy instead, per-branch profits are relatively 
homogeneous across banking groups, with higher marginal costs for Unicredito. The 
heterogeneity of marginal costs across banking groups is smaller in Italy compared to France. 
[Insert Table 5 here] 
In Tables 9a and 9b (in Appendix), we report a ranking of local markets based on our 
estimated measure of competition. As already observed the parameter cci varies considerably 
across local markets. In densely populated areas our measure cci takes smaller values 
indicating tougher competition. For instance in Paris cci assumes its smallest value. In Italy 
the overall variance of cci is greater. Notice that cci takes lower values in several Italian 
Northern provinces compared to Southern provinces. This result suggests that banks located 
in Northern regions face greater competition compared to those located in Southern regions, 






We now use the econometric model to simulate the ex-ante impact of mergers on 
competition. For each merger, we undertake the following exercise: we sum the branches of 
the merging banks in each local market and re-estimate the model assuming that these new 
entities replace the old ones, without changing the distribution of branches across local 
markets. It yields the estimated post-merger degree of competition, which we compare to the 
pre-merger degree of competition (estimated from the actual situation). We expect that this 
measure provides a useful guide to competition authorities to assess the impact of banks’ 
mergers on competition. However we recognize that our measure, which requires a very 
limited amount of information, cannot fully anticipate how rival banks adapt their branching 
networks after a merger as we keep as given the total number of branches.10 
 
                                                            
10  There is an empirical literature providing evidence that the anti-competitive impact of a merger may be 
considerably affected by the competitive reaction of non-merged firms and new entries in the market. (See for 
instance the discussion in Draganska et al., 2009.)   
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3.1 French mergers 
Two among the most important mergers really occurred in France in the recent years, 
that is Credit Mutuel (CM) with Credit Industriel Commercial (CIC) in 1998 and Crédit 
Agricole (CA) with Crédit Lyonnais (CL) in 2004. Given that our French dataset includes the 
number of branches for each merger as separate banking group even after the merger, we can 
exploit this information to retrieve the pre-merger situation (which corresponds to our 
estimated base model) and simulate the impact of the merger “as if” the merger occurred in 
our observation period. 
Table 6 reports the comparison of the relevant indicators between the base model and 
the model with the merger. The result of this exercise shows that these two mergers together 
improve competition in the industry. Table 9a (in Appendix) displays the impact of the two 
mergers in each single local market: the differences in the estimated values of the cci are 
significant and negative. 
[Insert Table 6 here] 
A further exercise is to add the merger between Banques Populaires (BP) and Caisses 
d’Epargne (CE), approved after 2007 to the previous simulation.  Also in this case the 
parameter cci decreases compared to the base model (see last row in Table 6 for France). This 
result proves that the initial pro-competitive effect of the merger still remains.11  
 
3.2  Italian mergers 
A similar exercise can be performed for the two most relevant Italian mergers in the 
recent years, namely Intesa (IN) with San Paolo (SP) and Unicredito (UN) with Capitalia 
(CP). Notice that in our observed period the exercise is “virtual” since the merger actually 
occurred at the end of 2007. In Table 6 we summarize the changes of the main indicators as a 
result of the two mergers.   
The two mergers have an anti-competitive effect, as it results from the increase in the 
estimated value of cci with respect to the base model (last row in Table 6 for Italy). The 
differences in the two measures of competition are significant as Table 9b (in Appendix) 
shows.  
                                                            
11 See Ivaldi (2006) for a detailed analysis of this merger, available upon request. 
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The difference between the impact of these mergers compared to the French case can 






In this section we first investigate the relation between our measure of competition and 
the usual measures of concentration at local market level, namely, the Herfindahl–Hirschman 
Index (HHI), the GINI index and the number of large undertakings in each local market. The 
idea behind these traditional measures is that, when market shares are uniformly distributed, 
the market power is more balanced among firms and, as a consequence, competition is 
greater. Indeed, the HHI is the sum of squared market shares and captures the degree of 
concentration in branching at local market level: this index gives more weight to changes in 
market shares of largest banks since large banks have greater shares. The GINI index 
measures the distance between the actual distribution and the case of uniform market shares: 
this index increases with the inequality between market shares. Finally we compute the 
number of banks with a market share above the average (N. large banks), in each specific 
market. 12 
What we would like to explore is whether our measure of degree of competition is 
similar to these usual concentration measures or conveys additional and more accurate 
information. To do so, we compute the correlations between our and the traditional measures 
at local market level. The results in Table 7 show that these correlations are not null, meaning 
that our degree of competition is indeed related to market structure as it falls with the HHI 
and it increases with the number of large banks in the market. For the GINI index, we observe 
that the correlation has opposite effects in the two countries: greater equality in the 
distribution of market shares increases competition in France, but not in Italy. 
[Insert Table 7 here] 
                                                            
12 The role of a large number of big players in enhancing competition is documented for instance by the debate 
around the proposal of mergers in the Canadian banking industry. Using Bank of Canada’s words in response to 
Minister of Finance (23 June 2003):  “In a given market, one player with a 45% market share can leave room for 
an acceptable level of competition, as long as there are two or three additional players with a certain critical mass 
who are also operating in the same market.”  
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Note that none of these traditional measures in isolation captures the degree of 
competition in a market, because they only focus on the supply side of the market, while we 
consider also the demand side when we measure the elasticity of profits to the number of 
branches through our index cci. 
To understand the impact of mergers on competition we analyze how they affect 
market structure at the local level. Table 8 shows that the two mergers of CA with CL and 
CM with CIC in France have a pro-competitive effect, since the average cci across 
Departments falls from 0.68 to 0.54. Although the two mergers generate two large banking 
groups in France, we observe a reduction in the Gini index from 0.57 to 0.53 and a rise in the 
number of banks with a market share above the average from 2.71 to 3.06. Notice that even 
though concentration rises as measured by the HHI due to the increase in the market shares of 
the top largest banks, according to our measure of the degree of competition the two French 
mergers promote competition. This positive impact on competition can be explained by the 
fact that they reduce the asymmetry in the distribution of market shares. The merger between 
CA and CL, two large players with complementary branching networks, and the merger 
between two medium players such as CM with CIC, increase the presence of several large 
banks in all Departments and this benefits competition. 
[Insert Table 8 here] 
In Italy instead, the mergers of IN with SP and UN with CP have a negative impact on 
competition, as evident from the increase in the value of cci  across provinces from 1.17 to 
1.27. In contrast with the French exercise, in Italy the asymmetry between market shares rises 
following the mergers; the Gini index rises from 0.58 to 0.63, the number of large banks 
declines from 3.59 to 3.16 and the HHI rises from 1900 to 2400. The impact of the two Italian 
mergers is clearly anti-competitive at local market level: they in fact take place among the top 
players in the market and the overall effect is a reinforcement of their previous strong local 
market power.  
Our econometric test shows how it would be misleading to base the impact assessment 
of a merger only on the change in the degree of concentration as it used to be in merger policy 
before the reforms in Europe and in the U.S, which have limited the use of the dominance 
criteria as the sole test in merger assessment13. In our simulation for instance, this rule would 
                                                            
13 See Shapiro (2010) and Gilbert and Rubinfield (2011) for reviews of merger guidelines in U.S. and E.U before 
the reforms. They both argue how pre-reform guidelines emphasized the stand-alone role of pre and post-merger 
HHI thresholds  to challenge a merger.  
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imply rejecting the French mergers, while we have shown their role in enhancing competition. 
At the same time, note that the data required to implement our measure is similar to those 





This paper addresses the question of how to measure the impact of mergers on 
competition in the banking sector. This question is relevant both from a positive and a 
normative point of view.  
We provide a measure of competition in retail banking markets, derived from a model 
where branching decisions are modelled together with market structure. This measure is based 
on the elasticity of profits with respect to branching: the smaller the elasticity the higher the 
degree of competition. Our evidence indicates that the retail banking industry in France is 
more competitive than in Italy.  
In addition we propose an empirical test to be used in the antitrust analysis for the ex-
ante impact assessment of mergers on competition. This test is parsimonious in terms of data 
requirements and is grounded on a theoretical model where competition is analysed together 
with market structure. In our simulated examples we exhibit either cases of pro- and anti-
competitive mergers. 
Our findings are based on a static model where banks choose their optimal branching 
size in each period. It is part of our future research agenda to take into account a more 
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Appendix – Tables 
  





























 Mean 12406.1 441 46 10.61   Mean 7064.2 237 19 7.89 
 Median 8091.4 373 23 5.36   Median 3647.6 163 7 4.10 
 Maximum 171591.3 1485 389 69.13   Maximum 128132.5 2050 435 83.04 
 Minimum 1691.1 91 0 0.00   Minimum 442.8 25 1 0.13 
 Standard deviation 18837.0 253 55 12.61   Standard deviation 15323.6 273 34 10.02 
Note:  Total deposits are expressed in Euro.        Note:  Total deposits are expressed in Euro. 
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 Table 2 – Base model (maximum likelihood estimation)  
FRANCE   Coefficient P-value     ITALY   Coefficient P-value  
cci 
Constant 0.662 0.000   
cci 
Constant 1.243 0.000
SHRUR 0.082 0.192    DBIGPRO -0.340 0.000
LPC -0.003 0.000   LPC -0.003 0.000
mc Bank dummies    mc Bank dummies   
  
Log 
likelihood   -346.0    
Log 
likelihood  -649.284
 # obs  862    # obs  1226
 % correct predictions* 84.1    % correct predictions* 75.4
Note: SHRUR is the share of rural areas within a county,  
LPC are loans per-capita.   
Note: DBIGPRO is a dummy indicating densely populated 
urban areas, LPC are loans per-capita. 





Table 3 – Goodness of  fit (comparison of predicted vs. actual observations in % ) 
FRANCE Predicted   ITALY  Predicted  
 Actual dk<0,k=1 dk≥0,k>1    Actual  dk<0,k=1 dk≥0,k>1  
dk<0,k=1 9.74 12.99 22.74   dk<0,k=1 5.22 19.58 24.8
dk≥0,k>1 2.9 74.36 77.26   dk≥0,k>1 5.06 70.15 75.2
 12.65 87.35 100     10.28 89.72 100
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Table 4 – Descriptive statistics on estimated values (local market values)    
FRANCE cci MC 
Per-branch
profit  
ITALY cci MC 
Per-branch 
profit 
 Mean 0.68 42.67 149.49   Mean 1.17 242.51 400.06
 Median 0.69 39.20 115.99   Median 1.19 216.90 297.03
 Maximum 0.71 99.38 2240.58   Maximum 1.23 502.23 2829.97
 Minimum 0.32 22.45 18.20   Minimum 0.64 132.89 88.55
 Standard deviation 0.04 22.71 208.34   Standard deviation 0.10 100.22 393.54
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BANQUE NATIONAL DE PARIS 28.83 166.15 2154  BANCA ANTONIANA - POPOLARE 254.5 387.52 1007
BANQUES POPULAIRES 22.45 150.95 2475  BANCA INTESA 150.99 369.59 3029
CREDIT AGRICOLE  51.62 112.67 6238  BANCA LOMBARDA E PIEMONTESE 254.5 474.63 787
CAISSES  D’EPARGNE  44.78 125.46 4312  BANCA NAZIONALE DEL LAVORO 132.89 366.86 731
CREDIT  INDUSTRIEL COMMERCIAL  39.20 186.97 1692  BANCA POPOLARE DI LODI 194.68 400.37 901
CREDIT  LYONNAIS  25.75 173.11 1947  BANCA POPOLARE DI VICENZA 254.5 446.76 524
CREDIT MUTUEL 48.96 182.56 3111  BANCA POPOLARE EMILIA ROMAGNA 254.5 410.12 1175
LA POSTE 99.38 81.86 15581  BANCHE POPOLARI UNITE (IN FORMAZIONE) 216.9 427.57 1205
SOCIETE GENERALE 23.02 166.43 2204  BANCO POPOLARE DI VERONA 254.5 450.27 1221
Mean 42,67 149,57 4412,67  BIPIEMME 446.58 540.84 713
Standard deviation 24,04 35,58 4429,78  CAPITALIA 200.53 371.07 2013
     CARIGE 254.5 422.8 508
     CREDITO EMILIANO - CREDEM 319.15 417.31 470
     MONTE DEI PASCHI DI SIENA 168.11 369.94 1908
     SANPAOLO IMI 178.57 371.02 3171
     UNICREDITO ITALIANO 502.23 373.24 3028
     Mean 252,35 412,49 1399,44
     Standard deviation 99,67 48,15 942,40
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Table 6-  Changes in the estimated values as a result of mergers   
FRANCE cci MC  ITALY cci MC 
Base model 0.68 42.67 
 
Base model 1.17 242.51 
CA+CL and CM+CIC 0.54 18.45 
 IN+SP and 
UN+CP 
1.27 335.54 
CA+CL and CM+CIC and CE+BP 0.55 19.08 
 Note: IN=Intesa, SP=San Paolo IMI, UN=Unicredito, 
CP= Capitalia 
Note: CA=Credit Agricole, CL=Credit Lyonnais, CM=Credit Mutuel, 
CIC= Crédit Industriel Commercial, CE=Caisses d'Epargne, BP=Banques 
Populaires 
 




Table 7- Correlation between competition and measures of market structure  
FRANCE cci HHI GINI 
N. Large 
banks  ITALY cci HHI GINI 
N. Large 
Banks 
cci 1.00 0.54 0.59 -0.49  cci 1 0.11 -0.07 -0.21 
HHI 0.54 1.00 0.93 -0.72  HHI 0.11 1.00 0.53 -0.01 
GINI 0.59 0.93 1.00 -0.70  GINI -0.07 0.53 1.00 -0.20 
N. Large banks -0.49 -0.72 -0.70 1.00  N. Large banks -0.21 -0.01 -0.20 1.00 
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Table 8 – Impact of mergers on the inverse  measures of competition and measures of market structure  
FRANCE cci Gini HHI 
N. large  
banks 
 ITALY cci Gini HHI N. large 
banks 
Base model 0.68 0.57 2400 2.71 
 
Base model 1.17 0.58 1900 3.59 
 (0.04) (0.12) (0.08) (0.90)   (0.09) (0.09) (0.11) (1.51) 
CA+CL and CM+CIC 0.54 0.53 2600 3.06 
 
IN+SP and UN+CP 1.27 0.63 2400 3.16 
 (0.03) (0.12) (0.08) (0.82)   (0.09) (0.09) (0.14) (1.17) 
CA+CL and CM+CIC  and CE+BP 0.55 0.50 2700 3.48 
 Note: standard deviations are in brackets. 
IN=Intesa, SP=San Paolo IMI, UN=Unicredito, CP= Capitalia. 
 (0.03) (0.14) (0.08) (0.71)       
Note: standard deviations are in brackets. 
CA=Credit Agricole, CL=Credit Lyonnais, CM=Credit Mutuel, CIC= Crédit Industriel Commercial, 
CE=Caisses d'Epargne, BP=Banques Populaires. 
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Table 9a – Descriptive statistics on estimated indicators (local market values)  
FRANCE Base model CA+CL and CM+CIC CA+CL and CM+CIC and CE+BP
 Name cci Gini HHI N_large cci Gini HHI N_large cci Gini HHI N_large 
 Paris 0.32 0.29 0.07 5 -0.03 0.24 0.10 4 -0.01 0.13 0.11 5
 Hauts-de-Seine 0.51 0.29 0.10 5 -0.07 0.24 0.13 4 -0.06 0.17 0.14 5
 Val-de-Marne 0.63 0.29 0.10 6 -0.10 0.21 0.13 5 -0.09 0.18 0.14 5
 Bouches-du-Rhône 0.64 0.37 0.12 4 -0.11 0.34 0.15 3 -0.10 0.30 0.16 3
 Seine-Saint-Denis 0.64 0.34 0.11 5 -0.10 0.23 0.13 4 -0.09 0.20 0.15 5
 Bas-Rhin 0.64 0.53 0.20 2 -0.13 * 0.51 0.24 3 -0.12 0.49 0.25 4
 Haute-Savoie 0.65 0.47 0.16 2 -0.13 * 0.39 0.19 3 -0.12 0.36 0.20 4
 Rhône 0.65 0.34 0.13 3 -0.13 * 0.33 0.16 4 -0.12 0.30 0.18 4
 Marne 0.66 0.54 0.22 3 -0.14 * 0.52 0.25 3 -0.13 0.49 0.26 3
 Haut-Rhin 0.66 0.56 0.22 2 -0.13 * 0.53 0.25 3 -0.12 0.52 0.27 4
 Essonne 0.66 0.31 0.14 4 -0.12 0.26 0.16 5 -0.11 0.27 0.18 5
 Nord 0.66 0.41 0.14 4 -0.12 0.33 0.18 5 -0.12 0.27 0.19 5
 Loire-Atlantique 0.66 0.43 0.16 3 -0.13 * 0.41 0.19 3 -0.12 0.36 0.21 4
 Yvelines 0.66 0.34 0.13 4 -0.13 * 0.26 0.15 5 -0.12 0.26 0.17 5
 Ille-et-Vilaine 0.67 0.51 0.18 3 -0.14 * 0.43 0.21 3 -0.13 0.38 0.22 4
 Territoire de Belfort 0.67 0.49 0.18 3 -0.13 * 0.46 0.21 3 -0.12 0.43 0.22 4
 Seine-et-Marne 0.67 0.42 0.18 3 -0.13 * 0.38 0.20 4 -0.13 0.34 0.21 5
 Finistère 0.67 0.55 0.19 3 -0.13 * 0.51 0.21 3 -0.13 0.46 0.22 4
 Loiret 0.67 0.45 0.17 3 -0.14 * 0.44 0.20 4 -0.13 0.42 0.21 4
 Gironde 0.67 0.45 0.18 4 -0.13 * 0.41 0.19 4 -0.13 0.40 0.21 4
 Val-d'Oise 0.67 0.39 0.15 5 -0.13 0.34 0.17 5 -0.12 0.31 0.19 5
 Vendée 0.67 0.62 0.23 3 -0.14 * 0.57 0.25 3 -0.13 0.52 0.25 3
 Var 0.67 0.45 0.16 3 -0.13 * 0.41 0.18 3 -0.12 0.39 0.19 3
 Hérault 0.68 0.56 0.18 4 -0.14 * 0.49 0.19 3 -0.13 0.48 0.20 3
 Haute-Garonne 0.68 0.40 0.15 3 -0.14 * 0.32 0.17 3 -0.13 * 0.34 0.20 3
 Morbihan 0.68 0.55 0.20 3 -0.14 * 0.49 0.22 3 -0.13 * 0.44 0.23 4
 Moselle 0.68 0.51 0.20 3 -0.14 * 0.50 0.23 4 -0.13 * 0.48 0.25 4
 Maine-et-Loire 0.68 0.60 0.23 3 -0.14 * 0.54 0.25 3 -0.13 * 0.49 0.26 4
 Isère 0.68 0.50 0.20 3 -0.14 * 0.44 0.22 3 -0.13 * 0.43 0.24 3
 Doubs 0.68 0.54 0.23 2 -0.14 * 0.51 0.25 3 -0.14 * 0.49 0.26 4
 Vaucluse 0.68 0.55 0.17 4 -0.13 * 0.50 0.19 3 -0.13 0.47 0.20 3
 Côte-d'Or 0.68 0.54 0.22 4 -0.14 * 0.50 0.24 4 -0.14 * 0.47 0.25 4
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 Name cci Gini HHI N_large cci Gini HHI N_large cci Gini HHI N_large 
 Alpes-Maritimes 0.68 0.38 0.13 4 -0.14 * 0.35 0.16 4 -0.13 * 0.34 0.17 4
 Pyrénées-Orientales 0.68 0.62 0.24 3 -0.14 * 0.56 0.26 3 -0.13 * 0.56 0.28 3
 Mayenne 0.68 0.67 0.27 3 -0.14 * 0.61 0.28 3 -0.14 * 0.56 0.29 3
 Gard 0.68 0.63 0.25 3 -0.14 * 0.57 0.26 3 -0.13 0.56 0.27 3
 Meurthe-et-Moselle 0.68 0.44 0.20 3 -0.14 * 0.46 0.23 4 -0.13 * 0.41 0.24 4
 Indre-et-Loire 0.68 0.58 0.26 3 -0.14 * 0.55 0.28 3 -0.13 * 0.55 0.29 3
 Savoie 0.68 0.63 0.22 3 -0.14 * 0.56 0.23 2 -0.13 * 0.56 0.24 3
 Côtes d'Armor 0.68 0.66 0.26 3 -0.14 * 0.57 0.27 3 -0.14 * 0.53 0.27 3
 Pyrénées-Atlantiques 0.68 0.48 0.15 4 -0.14 * 0.43 0.18 3 -0.13 * 0.42 0.19 3
 Aveyron 0.68 0.69 0.34 3 -0.14 * 0.66 0.35 3 -0.14 * 0.65 0.36 3
 Deux-Sèvres 0.69 0.58 0.22 4 -0.14 * 0.52 0.24 4 -0.14 * 0.48 0.25 4
 Loire 0.69 0.48 0.19 3 -0.14 * 0.46 0.22 3 -0.13 * 0.44 0.23 3
 Charente-Maritime 0.69 0.58 0.24 2 -0.14 * 0.55 0.25 3 -0.14 * 0.53 0.26 4
 Vosges 0.69 0.51 0.22 3 -0.14 * 0.46 0.23 4 -0.13 * 0.43 0.25 4
 Calvados 0.69 0.48 0.20 2 -0.14 * 0.47 0.22 3 -0.14 * 0.40 0.23 4
 Seine-Maritime 0.69 0.43 0.16 3 -0.14 * 0.40 0.18 4 -0.14 * 0.34 0.19 4
 Oise 0.69 0.54 0.21 3 -0.14 * 0.49 0.23 3 -0.13 * 0.44 0.24 3
 Sarthe 0.69 0.57 0.24 4 -0.14 * 0.55 0.26 4 -0.14 * 0.49 0.27 4
 Ain 0.69 0.58 0.25 2 -0.14 * 0.56 0.27 3 -0.14 * 0.53 0.28 4
 Aube 0.69 0.57 0.25 2 -0.15 * 0.51 0.27 2 -0.14 * 0.52 0.28 3
 Pas-de-Calais 0.69 0.54 0.19 3 -0.14 * 0.46 0.21 4 -0.13 0.39 0.22 4
 Tarn 0.69 0.58 0.22 4 -0.14 * 0.51 0.24 4 -0.14 * 0.50 0.26 3
 Haute-Vienne 0.69 0.66 0.28 3 -0.14 * 0.56 0.29 3 -0.14 * 0.55 0.31 3
 Landes 0.69 0.62 0.26 2 -0.14 * 0.58 0.28 2 -0.14 * 0.57 0.29 3
 Drôme 0.69 0.57 0.24 3 -0.14 * 0.55 0.25 3 -0.14 * 0.53 0.27 3
 Lot-et-Garonne 0.69 0.66 0.28 2 -0.14 * 0.61 0.29 2 -0.14 * 0.60 0.31 3
 Tarn-et-Garonne 0.69 0.67 0.31 2 -0.14 * 0.61 0.32 2 -0.14 * 0.60 0.33 3
 Manche 0.69 0.53 0.20 4 -0.14 * 0.49 0.22 4 -0.14 * 0.43 0.23 4
 Puy-de-Dôme 0.69 0.64 0.26 2 -0.14 * 0.58 0.29 2 -0.14 * 0.57 0.30 3
 Eure-et-Loir 0.69 0.54 0.20 4 -0.14 * 0.49 0.22 4 -0.14 * 0.43 0.23 4
 Loir-et-Cher 0.69 0.63 0.29 2 -0.14 * 0.61 0.30 2 -0.14 * 0.58 0.31 3
 Vienne 0.69 0.65 0.29 3 -0.14 * 0.61 0.31 3 -0.14 * 0.60 0.31 3
 Charente 0.69 0.64 0.31 2 -0.15 * 0.61 0.33 2 -0.14 * 0.58 0.33 3
 Jura 0.70 0.61 0.28 3 -0.15 * 0.56 0.29 4 -0.14 * 0.58 0.31 4
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 Name cci Gini HHI N_large cci Gini HHI N_large cci Gini HHI N_large 
 Somme 0.70 0.65 0.25 3 -0.14 * 0.57 0.27 3 -0.14 * 0.50 0.27 3
 Aude 0.70 0.76 0.41 2 -0.15 * 0.72 0.41 2 -0.14 * 0.71 0.42 3
 Orne 0.70 0.58 0.22 3 -0.15 * 0.52 0.24 3 -0.14 * 0.47 0.25 4
 Hautes-Alpes 0.70 0.73 0.34 2 -0.15 * 0.68 0.35 2 -0.14 * 0.67 0.36 3
 Gers 0.70 0.70 0.30 2 -0.15 * 0.65 0.32 2 -0.14 * 0.64 0.33 3
 Cantal 0.70 0.77 0.38 2 -0.15 * 0.72 0.39 2 -0.14 * 0.71 0.40 3
 Aisne 0.70 0.62 0.27 3 -0.14 * 0.57 0.28 3 -0.14 * 0.52 0.29 3
 Corrèze 0.70 0.73 0.34 2 -0.15 * 0.66 0.35 2 -0.14 * 0.66 0.36 3
 Saône-et-Loire 0.70 0.57 0.26 3 -0.15 * 0.54 0.28 3 -0.14 * 0.52 0.29 3
 Eure 0.70 0.52 0.21 3 -0.14 * 0.49 0.23 3 -0.14 * 0.43 0.24 3
 Haute-Loire 0.70 0.69 0.29 3 -0.15 * 0.64 0.30 3 -0.14 * 0.61 0.31 3
 Indre 0.70 0.70 0.31 3 -0.15 * 0.64 0.32 3 -0.14 * 0.62 0.33 3
 Cher 0.70 0.67 0.28 2 -0.15 * 0.64 0.29 2 -0.14 * 0.63 0.30 3
 Yonne 0.70 0.65 0.30 3 -0.15 * 0.61 0.31 3 -0.14 * 0.61 0.32 3
 Haute-Saône 0.70 0.66 0.35 2 -0.15 * 0.65 0.36 3 -0.14 * 0.63 0.37 4
 Allier 0.70 0.65 0.30 3 -0.15 * 0.59 0.31 3 -0.14 * 0.58 0.33 3
 Lozère 0.70 0.76 0.40 2 -0.15 * 0.74 0.41 2 -0.14 * 0.73 0.42 3
 Ardennes 0.70 0.62 0.27 2 -0.15 * 0.61 0.30 3 -0.14 * 0.56 0.30 4
 Lot 0.70 0.69 0.31 3 -0.15 * 0.66 0.33 3 -0.14 * 0.65 0.35 3
 Corse A 0.70 0.74 0.45 1 -0.15 * 0.74 0.46 2 -0.14 * 0.73 0.46 2
 Nièvre 0.70 0.69 0.32 3 -0.15 * 0.65 0.33 3 -0.14 * 0.64 0.34 3
 Hautes-Pyrénées 0.70 0.62 0.28 2 -0.15 * 0.58 0.30 2 -0.14 * 0.58 0.31 3
 Dordogne 0.71 0.75 0.38 2 -0.15 * 0.69 0.38 2 -0.14 * 0.68 0.39 2
 Meuse 0.71 0.72 0.38 2 -0.15 * 0.71 0.39 2 -0.14 * 0.69 0.40 3
 Ariège 0.71 0.72 0.39 2 -0.15 * 0.68 0.40 2 -0.14 * 0.67 0.41 3
 Ardèche 0.71 0.69 0.33 3 -0.15 * 0.68 0.35 3 -0.14 * 0.65 0.35 3
 Corse B 0.71 0.78 0.50 1 -0.15 * 0.77 0.50 2 -0.14 * 0.75 0.51 2
 Haute-Marne 0.71 0.72 0.40 2 -0.15 * 0.69 0.41 2 -0.14 * 0.67 0.41 3
 Alpes-haute-Provence 0.71 0.71 0.33 2 -0.15 * 0.67 0.34 2 -0.14 * 0.66 0.35 3
 Creuse 0.71 0.74 0.39 2 -0.15 * 0.71 0.40 2 -0.15 * 0.69 0.41 3
Note: Difference in cci relative to base model significant at  10%  level (*) or at 5%  level (**). 
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Table 9b – Descriptive statistics on estimated indicators (local market values) 
ITALY Base model IN+SP and UN+CP 
 Name cci Gini HHI N large cci Gini HHI N large
 MILANO 0.64 0.50 0.10 5.00 0.05 0.59 0.15 4.00
 ROMA 0.76 0.53 0.10 6.00 0.08 0.64 0.16 4.00
 TORINO 0.84 0.70 0.28 4.00 0.10 0.77 0.43 2.00
 NAPOLI 0.88 0.57 0.27 6.00 0.11 0.69 0.42 4.00
 FIRENZE 1.11 0.64 0.14 2.00 0.08 * 0.67 0.15 4.00
 SIENA 1.12 0.77 0.42 2.00 0.08 * 0.75 0.42 2.00
 BERGAMO 1.13 0.60 0.18 5.00 0.09 ** 0.64 0.22 4.00
 BOLZANO 1.13 0.65 0.04 1.00 0.09 ** 0.71 0.04 0.00
 BOLOGNA 1.13 0.59 0.14 4.00 0.09 ** 0.64 0.17 3.00
 BRESCIA 1.14 0.59 0.16 4.00 0.09 ** 0.66 0.19 4.00
 PADOVA 1.14 0.70 0.30 6.00 0.09 ** 0.75 0.39 4.00
 MODENA 1.15 0.61 0.14 4.00 0.09 ** 0.65 0.16 4.00
 TRENTO 1.15 0.74 0.21 3.00 0.09 ** 0.74 0.23 2.00
 RIMINI 1.15 0.54 0.07 2.00 0.09 ** 0.61 0.10 3.00
 MANTOVA 1.15 0.56 0.17 4.00 0.09 ** 0.61 0.19 4.00
 PARMA 1.15 0.59 0.17 7.00 0.09 ** 0.67 0.22 4.00
 PRATO 1.15 0.61 0.13 5.00 0.09 ** 0.61 0.14 5.00
 REGGIO EMILIA 1.15 0.58 0.13 6.00 0.09 ** 0.63 0.17 6.00
 FORLI'-CESENA 1.15 0.61 0.08 2.00 0.09 ** 0.64 0.09 2.00
 VICENZA 1.16 0.64 0.17 6.00 0.09 ** 0.67 0.21 5.00
 VERONA 1.16 0.68 0.18 5.00 0.09 ** 0.73 0.21 4.00
 ANCONA 1.16 0.46 0.07 2.00 0.09 ** 0.51 0.09 3.00
 TREVISO 1.16 0.62 0.13 5.00 0.09 ** 0.69 0.17 4.00
 UDINE 1.16 0.60 0.23 5.00 0.09 ** 0.71 0.38 4.00
 RAVENNA 1.16 0.62 0.08 4.00 0.09 ** 0.65 0.09 3.00
 BIELLA 1.16 0.66 0.19 2.00 0.09 ** 0.72 0.24 1.00
 SONDRIO 1.17 0.57 0.01 0.00 0.10 ** 0.66 0.02 0.00
 LODI 1.17 0.58 0.30 3.00 0.10 ** 0.67 0.45 3.00
 LUCCA 1.17 0.61 0.16 4.00 0.10 ** 0.58 0.16 4.00
 MACERATA 1.17 0.38 0.04 1.00 0.10 ** 0.38 0.05 1.00
 PESARO E URBINO 1.17 0.59 0.09 5.00 0.10 ** 0.70 0.15 4.00
 PIACENZA 1.17 0.57 0.21 3.00 0.10 ** 0.65 0.26 2.00
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 Name cci Gini HHI N large cci  Gini HHI N large
 LECCO 1.17 0.54 0.07 3.00 0.10 ** 0.61 0.10 2.00
 CREMONA 1.18 0.62 0.22 3.00 0.10 ** 0.68 0.31 2.00
 VARESE 1.18 0.61 0.14 4.00 0.10 ** 0.66 0.18 4.00
 COMO 1.18 0.63 0.16 4.00 0.10 ** 0.71 0.29 4.00
 PORDENONE 1.18 0.61 0.25 4.00 0.10 ** 0.73 0.44 3.00
 AREZZO 1.18 0.70 0.14 2.00 0.10 ** 0.69 0.14 2.00
 PISTOIA 1.18 0.62 0.19 2.00 0.10 ** 0.60 0.19 2.00
 VENEZIA 1.18 0.62 0.31 7.00 0.10 ** 0.74 0.50 4.00
 PESCARA 1.18 0.55 0.15 2.00 0.10 ** 0.63 0.18 3.00
 PERUGIA 1.18 0.63 0.16 3.00 0.10 ** 0.64 0.19 3.00
 ALESSANDRIA 1.18 0.54 0.15 6.00 0.10 ** 0.59 0.19 5.00
 CUNEO 1.18 0.70 0.20 4.00 0.10 ** 0.70 0.22 4.00
 GENOVA 1.19 0.56 0.14 6.00 0.10 ** 0.63 0.17 4.00
 PISA 1.19 0.62 0.12 2.00 0.10 ** 0.63 0.12 2.00
 NOVARA 1.19 0.58 0.14 4.00 0.10 ** 0.62 0.18 3.00
 LIVORNO 1.19 0.65 0.19 2.00 0.10 ** 0.64 0.20 3.00
 ASCOLI PICENO 1.19 0.53 0.12 4.00 0.10 ** 0.61 0.17 4.00
 ASTI 1.19 0.65 0.06 3.00 0.10 ** 0.67 0.06 3.00
 ROVIGO 1.19 0.68 0.61 4.00 0.10 ** 0.72 0.78 3.00
 SAVONA 1.19 0.60 0.25 4.00 0.10 ** 0.63 0.28 4.00
 VERBANO-CUSIO-OSSOLA 1.20 0.60 0.12 2.00 0.10 ** 0.65 0.15 2.00
 BELLUNO 1.20 0.68 0.21 3.00 0.10 ** 0.72 0.25 2.00
 GROSSETO 1.20 0.67 0.28 2.00 0.10 ** 0.67 0.28 2.00
 FERRARA 1.20 0.58 0.05 2.00 0.10 ** 0.61 0.06 3.00
 PAVIA 1.20 0.53 0.17 4.00 0.10 ** 0.61 0.28 4.00
 VERCELLI 1.20 0.68 0.26 4.00 0.10 ** 0.75 0.36 3.00
 GORIZIA 1.20 0.51 0.39 4.00 0.10 ** 0.63 0.61 2.00
 TRIESTE 1.20 0.48 0.21 4.00 0.10 ** 0.61 0.31 3.00
 MASSA 1.20 0.56 0.17 4.00 0.10 ** 0.48 0.17 3.00
 TERAMO 1.20 0.53 0.11 1.00 0.11 ** 0.63 0.17 1.00
 TERNI 1.20 0.69 0.23 4.00 0.11 ** 0.66 0.25 4.00
 AOSTA 1.20 0.65 0.34 2.00 0.11 ** 0.69 0.43 2.00
 LA SPEZIA 1.20 0.58 0.23 3.00 0.11 ** 0.59 0.25 3.00
 SASSARI 1.20 0.76 0.46 2.00 0.11 ** 0.78 0.48 2.00
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 Name cci Gini HHI N large cci  Gini HHI N large
 IMPERIA 1.21 0.56 0.18 5.00 0.11 ** 0.63 0.25 3.00
 VITERBO 1.21 0.57 0.19 4.00 0.11 ** 0.53 0.21 3.00
 CAGLIARI 1.21 0.72 0.35 4.00 0.11 ** 0.76 0.38 3.00
 CHIETI 1.21 0.48 0.10 2.00 0.11 ** 0.52 0.12 2.00
 RAGUSA 1.21 0.48 0.08 1.00 0.11 ** 0.56 0.11 2.00
 BARI 1.21 0.49 0.11 7.00 0.11 ** 0.61 0.17 5.00
 L'AQUILA 1.21 0.68 0.21 3.00 0.11 ** 0.66 0.22 4.00
 CATANIA 1.21 0.48 0.10 3.00 0.11 ** 0.55 0.12 3.00
 PALERMO 1.22 0.54 0.18 1.00 0.11 ** 0.61 0.22 2.00
 CAMPOBASSO 1.22 0.50 0.16 4.00 0.11 ** 0.60 0.25 3.00
 RIETI 1.22 0.69 0.19 3.00 0.11 ** 0.73 0.23 2.00
 TRAPANI 1.22 0.41 0.11 4.00 0.11 ** 0.43 0.14 4.00
 LATINA 1.22 0.54 0.18 3.00 0.11 ** 0.56 0.22 3.00
 SALERNO 1.22 0.57 0.18 6.00 0.11 ** 0.60 0.23 5.00
 SIRACUSA 1.22 0.52 0.12 2.00 0.11 ** 0.61 0.16 3.00
 MATERA 1.22 0.60 0.25 3.00 0.11 ** 0.53 0.26 3.00
 LECCE 1.22 0.50 0.08 3.00 0.11 ** 0.58 0.11 3.00
 FOGGIA 1.22 0.47 0.11 6.00 0.11 ** 0.53 0.14 6.00
 MESSINA 1.22 0.46 0.12 3.00 0.11 ** 0.53 0.16 4.00
 CATANZARO 1.22 0.29 0.13 6.00 0.11 ** 0.30 0.16 5.00
 FROSINONE 1.22 0.63 0.22 3.00 0.11 ** 0.69 0.26 2.00
 CALTANISSETTA 1.22 0.56 0.20 3.00 0.11 ** 0.56 0.21 4.00
 TARANTO 1.22 0.39 0.14 5.00 0.11 ** 0.45 0.19 5.00
 COSENZA 1.23 0.52 0.21 4.00 0.11 ** 0.55 0.23 3.00
 POTENZA 1.23 0.54 0.10 3.00 0.11 ** 0.53 0.11 3.00
 ORISTANO 1.23 0.83 0.63 1.00 0.11 ** 0.83 0.63 1.00
 AGRIGENTO 1.23 0.52 0.20 4.00 0.11 ** 0.61 0.26 3.00
 NUORO 1.23 0.85 0.70 1.00 0.11 ** 0.86 0.71 1.00
 AVELLINO 1.23 0.65 0.27 3.00 0.11 ** 0.68 0.31 3.00
 CASERTA 1.23 0.63 0.52 5.00 0.11 ** 0.72 0.74 4.00
 ISERNIA 1.23 0.41 0.24 4.00 0.11 ** 0.56 0.40 3.00
 CROTONE 1.23 0.47 0.26 4.00 0.11 ** 0.46 0.28 4.00
 ENNA 1.23 0.50 0.24 4.00 0.11 ** 0.51 0.25 4.00
 BENEVENTO 1.23 0.51 0.17 3.00 0.11 ** 0.52 0.20 3.00
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 BRINDISI 1.23 0.44 0.13 3.00 0.11 ** 0.51 0.19 2.00
 REGGIO CALABRIA 1.23 0.47 0.20 5.00 0.11 ** 0.47 0.23 4.00
 VIBO VALENTIA 1.23 0.51 0.28 5.00 0.11 ** 0.51 0.30 5.00
Note: Difference in cci relative to base model significant at  10%  level (*) or at 5%  level (**). 
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